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This book has two related goals, to introduce readers to the field of ecological ethics and 
to defend ecocentrism.  The author explains that ecological ethics is closely related to 
environmental ethics in that both concern how humans should treat the natural world, but 
differs from it in conceptualizing humans as part of the web of nature, not ‘above’ nature 
as its stewards or masters.  His thesis is that it is possible to set forth a “reasonably coherent 
set of ethical principles” (1) for an ecocentric ethic, which we need desperately in order to 
address the global ecological crisis we find ourselves in. 
Following other environmental theorists, Curry places environmental theories on a 
continuum from shallow green, through mid-green, to deep green, or ecocentric.   Shallow 
green theories are human-centered, whereas mid-green theories extend moral standing 
to some or all animals and plants, and deep green theories are nature-centered. Shallow 
green and mid-green theories start from the assumption that human beings have intrinsic 
value, because of their rationality, and consider whether intrinsic value can be ascribed 
by extension to animals and other living beings.  Each of these theories posits a basis for 
ascribing intrinsic value, such as rationality, the capacity to suffer, self awareness, or the 
capacity to be “benefited or harmed in relation to its potential biological development,” 
(61) none of which apply to inanimate objects. 
A fundamental distinction between ecocentric and other theories of environmental ethics 
is its ascription of intrinsic value to all natural objects, including species and places. 
Accordingly, humans must respect and protect nature for its own sake, not only in order 
to meet their own needs.  For Curry and other deep green theorists, this implies that, 
although ecocentrism is not anti-human, humans may on occasion have to sacrifice certain 
of their interests to preserve the interests of non-human nature. 
Curry is sympathetic to all ecocentric theories, especially Sylvan’s deep green theory and 
ecofeminist theory, but the one he is committed to differs in some respects from the others. 
For example, he holds that natural objects should not be conceptualized in material terms 
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alone, but have a spiritual aspect as well.  Nature is sacred, and the proper human attitude 
toward it is reverence.  No other attitude, in his view, including respect, compassion and 
appreciation, will move us to the action necessary to nurture and preserve it.
Another difference, especially from the land ethic and Gaia theory, is that Curry does 
not think it is possible to specify the basis on which natural objects are ascribed intrinsic 
value.  It is simply a fundamental commitment of ecocentrism for him.  He says, “Such 
value is ultimately an inexhaustible mystery.  It cannot be fully explained, analyzed or 
justified in terms of other concepts or values” (104).
Finally, Curry sees ecocentric ethics as coexisting with other ethical systems, such as 
those concerned with social justice, in a pluralistic moral landscape.  No one of these 
systems answers all of our moral questions definitively, and none is all-encompassing. 
He is aware that pluralism is a disappointment to those who long for moral certainty and 
the reassurance that all moral questions are ultimately resolvable in terms of highest 
principles, but holds that we must always be prepared to present and justify our ideas in 
the public arena, where we will convince others as much by our actions as by our words.
Neophytes in environmental theory, especially those whose inclinations do not lie in 
the direction of ecocentrism, will have difficulty following some of the argumentation 
in the book, as it is sometimes compressed and relies on references to positions of other 
authors.  Those who have a background in environmental ethics will appreciate the book 
for gathering together, categorizing, and clearly presenting the main features of a large 
number of theories, and for its spirited defense of ecocentrism.  
Readers will come away with a heightened understanding of the value of ecocentric ethics 
in dealing with our current ecological crisis, but with some questions as well.  For example, 
how can Curry, who characterizes our experience of nature as pluralist, perspectival, 
and sensuous, identify truth with goodness, thus allowing no room in his ethical system 
for fear or loathing of any natural object or event?  It may be true that “nature is what 
enables us to do anything” (139) but it also sends us flood, famine, and pestilence.  Can an 
environmental ethic based on reverence for nature deal with the suffering we endure as a 
result of natural catastrophes as well as our good fortune to live in a beautiful, bountiful 
world?
